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Abstract. We address the problem of emulating a shared read/write
memory in a message passing system using a storage server prone to
Byzantine failures. Although cryptography can be used to ensure con-
ﬁdentiality and integrity of the data, nothing can prevent a malicious
server from returning obsolete data. Fork-linearizability [1] guarantees
that if a malicious server hides an update of some client from another
client, then these two clients will never see each others’ updates again.
Fork-linearizability is arguably the strongest consistency property at-
tainable in the presence of a malicious server. Recent work [2] has shown
that there is no fork-linearizable shared memory emulation that supports
wait-free operations. On the positive side, it has been shown that lock-
based emulations exist [1,2]. Lock-based protocols are fragile because they
are blocking if clients may crash. In this paper we present for the ﬁrst
time lock-free emulations of fork-linearizable shared memory. We have
developed two protocols, Linear and Concur. With a correct server,
both protocols guarantee linearizability and that every operation suc-
cessfully completes in the absence of step contention, while interfering
operations terminate by aborting. The Concur algorithm additionally
ensures that concurrent operations invoked on diﬀerent registers com-
plete successfully.
Keywords: Fork-linearizability, abortable objects, lock-freedom, shared
memory, online collaboration.
1 Introduction
Fast broadband access to the Internet allows users to beneﬁt from online services
such as storing their data remotely and sharing it with other users. Examples
for such services, also known as storage or computing “clouds” are Amazon S3,
Nirvanix CloudNAS, and Microsoft SkyDrive [3]. These services oﬀer full data
administration such that a user does not need to care for backups or server
maintenance and the data is available on demand. Such an infrastructure makes
online collaboration (multiple users working on the same logical data) based on
shared storage very attractive. Examples of existing solutions for online collab-
oration are the well-known revision control systems like CVS [4] and SVN [5],
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the storage management system WebDAV [6], upcoming Web 2.0 applications
[7] like Google docs [8], and a large number of distributed ﬁle systems [9].
Online collaboration usually assumes that the participating clients trust each
other — otherwise there exists no basis for reasonable communication. However,
when the shared storage is provided by a third party, clients may not fully trust
the service, e.g. it can corrupt or leak sensitive data. Cryptographic techniques
such as hash functions, message authentication codes (MACs) and signatures
can be used to prevent unauthorized access to data (conﬁdentiality) and un-
detectable corruption of the data (integrity). Progress and consistency cannot
always be guaranteed when the storage service1 is untrusted. A malicious server
may simply refuse to process client requests and it can violate linearizability
by omitting a recent update of one client and presenting an outdated value to
another client. This split brain attack is called forking and cannot be prevented.
However, once a forking attack is mounted, it can be easily detected using a
fork-linearizable storage protocol. Fork-linearizability [1] ensures that once two
clients are forked, they never see each others’ updates after that without reveal-
ing the server as faulty. Without fork-consistency, a malicious server is able to
present data updates to clients in such a way that no client can say whether the
set of updates of other clients it sees is complete or not, nor can such malicious
behavior be easily detected, making reliable collaboration impossible. Once such
a partitioning occurs, the clients stop hearing from each other. A client that has
not seen updates from another client for a while can use out-of-band communi-
cation (as e.g. phone or e-mail) to ﬁnd out if the server is misbehaving.
Recent work [2] has shown that even if the server behaves correctly, clients
cannot complete their operations independently from each other because this
introduces a vulnerability that can be exploited by a Byzantine server to violate
fork-linearizability. This means that in an asynchronous system there is no wait-
free [10] emulation of fork-linearizable storage on a Byzantine server. On the
positive side, the SUNDR [1] protocol and the concurrent protocol by Cachin et
al. [2] show the existence of fork-linearizable Byzantine emulations using locks.
However, lock-based protocols are problematic as they can block in the presence
of faulty clients that crash while holding the lock.
Paper Contributions. In this paper we present two lock-free emulations of fork-
linearizable shared memory on an untrusted server. In runs in which the server
behaves correctly, our proposed protocols Linear and Concur ensure lineariz-
ability [11], and that each operation executed in the absence of concurrency suc-
cessfully completes. Under concurrency, operations may complete by aborting.
Both protocols emulate a shared memory consisting of n single-writer multiple-
reader (SWMR) registers, one for each of the n clients, where register i is up-
dated only by client Ci and may be read by all clients. While both protocols
address lock-free fork-linearizability, they solve two distinct issues. The Lin-
ear protocol, which is the ﬁrst lock-free fork-linearizable implementation at all,
oﬀers a communication complexity of O(n). The Concur protocol improves
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on the handling of concurrent operations such that overlapping operations ac-
cessing diﬀerent registers are not perceived as concurrent, and therefore they
are not aborted. However, it has a communication complexity of O(n2). Both
protocols allow concurrent operations to abort in order to circumvent the im-
possibility result by Cachin et al. [2]. The necessary condition for aborting is
step contention [12], and thus, pending operations of crashed clients never cause
other operations to abort. As a ﬁnal contribution, note that the existence of
abortable fork-linearizable storage implies the existence of obstruction-free [13]
fork-linearizable storage.
We now give a rough intuition of why aborting helps to circumvent the given
impossibility of wait-free fork-linearizability. With both our protocols, if mul-
tiple operations compete for the same register, then there is only one winner
and all other operations are aborted. On a correct server, this strategy ensures
that all successful operations applied to the same register access the register
sequentially. Operations have timestamps attached to them and the sequential
execution establishes a total order on operations and the corresponding times-
tamps. The algorithm ensures that a forking attack breaks the total order on
timestamps. If a malicious server does not present the most recent update to
a read operation, then the timestamps of the omitted write operation and that
of the read operation become incomparable and the two clients are forked. The
algorithm guarantees that also future operations of those two clients cannot be
ordered and thus they remain forked forever.
2 Related Work
Mazi` eres and Shasha [1] have introduced the notion of fork-linearizability and
they have implemented the ﬁrst fork-linearizable multi-user network ﬁle system
SUNDR. The SUNDR protocol may block in case a client crashes even when
the storage server is correct. Cachin et al. [2] implements a more eﬃcient fork-
linearizable storage protocol based on SUNDR which reduces communication
complexity from O(n2)t oO(n). The presented protocols are blocking and thus
they have the same fundamental drawback as SUNDR. The authors [2] also
prove that there is no wait-free emulation of fork-linearizable storage. They do
so by exhibiting a run with concurrent operations where some client has to wait
for another client to complete. Oprea and Reiter [14] deﬁne the weaker notion
of fork-sequential consistency. Intuitively the diﬀerence to fork-linearizability is
that fork-sequential consistency does not necessarily preserve the real-time or-
der of operations from diﬀerent clients. In a recent work, Cachin et al. [15] show
that there is no wait-free emulation of fork-sequential consistent storage on a
Byzantine server. It is important to note that these impossibility results do not
rule out the existence of emulations of fork-linearizable storage with abortable
operations [16] or weaker liveness guarantees such as obstruction-freedom [13].
Cachin et al. [17] presents the storage service FAUST which wait-free emu-
lates a shared memory with a new consistency semantics called weak fork-
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in two fundamental ways. After being forked, two clients may see each others’
updates once (at-most-on-join property) and secondly, the real-time order among
the operations which are the last of each client is not ensured.
Li and Mazi` eres [18] study systems where storage is implemented from 3f +1
server replicas and more than f replicas are Byzantine faulty. They present a
storage protocol which ensures fork* consistency. Similar to weak fork-lineariza-
bility, fork* consistency allows that two forked clients may be joined at most
once (at-most-one-join property).
The notion of abortable objects has been introduced by Aguilera et al. [16].
The paper shows the existence of a universal abortable object construction from
abortable registers. It is the ﬁrst construction of an obstruction-free universal
type from base objects weaker than registers. In a follow-up paper [19] it has been
shown that in a partially synchronous system, abortable objects can be boosted
to wait-free objects. This makes abortable objects, including our abortable fork-
linearizable read/write emulation very attractive.
Summing up, to date there is no lock-free emulation of fork-linearizable stor-
age even though lock-free solutions can be made practically wait-free using boost-
ing techniques as described by Aguilera et al. [19].
3 System Model and Deﬁnitions
Similar to the models used in recent work on fork-linearizability [2],[1], we con-
sider a distributed system consisting of a single server S and n clients C1,...,C n.
The clients may fail by crashing but they never deviate from the protocol. The
server may be faulty and deviate arbitrarily from its protocol exhibiting non-
responsive-arbitrary faults [20] (Byzantine [21]). The clients communicate with
the server by sending messages over reliable channels directly to the server, form-
ing an asynchronous network. The shared functionality provided by the server
is a read/write register. A read/write register provides operations by which the
clients can access the register. An operation is deﬁned by two events,a ninvoca-
tion event and a response event. To represent an abort of execution, there are
two types of response events: abort and ok events respectively. An additional
event type constitute crash events representing the act of a client failing. We call
operation op complete, if there exists a matching response event to the invoca-
tion event of op,e l s eop is denoted as incomplete.A no p e r a t i o ni ssuccessful,i ﬀ
it is complete and the response event is an ok event. An operation is aborted,i f
it is complete and the response event is an abort event. Operation op precedes
operation op  iﬀ op is complete before the invocation event of op .I fop precedes
op  we denote op and op  as sequential operations. Else, if neither operation pre-
cedes the other, then op and op  are said to be are concurrent.A nexecution of
the system is deﬁned as the sequence of events occurring at the clients.
A read/write register X[i]p r o v i d e saRead and a Write operation to the
clients. The response event to a client’s operation is either ok or abort. Client
Ci may use the Write operation to store a value v from domain Value in register
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av a l u ev is returned, denoted as Read(i) → v. The server implements n single-
writer multiple-reader (SWMR) registers X[1...n] where each client Ci writes
only to X[i] and may read from all other registers. The sequential speciﬁcation of
a register requires that if a Read operation returns a value, it returns the value
written by the last preceding Write operation.
We assume that each client interacts sequentially with the read/write regis-
ter, i.e. a client invokes a new operation only after the previous operation has
completed.
Further we assume that clients have access to a digital signature scheme used
by each client to sign its messages such that any other client can determine the
authenticity of a message by verifying the corresponding signature. Further, the
Byzantine server is not able to forge the signatures.
The consistency condition for the read/write register is deﬁned in terms of the
sequence σ of events the shared register exhibits in an execution as observed by
the clients. Such a sequence, also called history, contains invocation, response,
and crash events. To ease the deﬁnition of consistency conditions and the reason-
ing about correctness, we deﬁne two transformations to derive simpler histories
from more complicated ones, while maintaining plausibility of execution. Intu-
itively, the transformations remove all operations from a history that do not take
eﬀect.
Deﬁnition 1. An operation op of client takes eﬀect if and only if
1. op is successful OR
2. op is a Write operation and
there exists a Read operation that returns the value written by op.
We now deﬁne the two transformations CrashComplete and AbortCom-
plete.
Deﬁnition 2. The transformations CrashComplete and AbortComplete
take a sequence of events σ as input and return a sequence of events σ  as output.
– CrashComplete: We deﬁne σ  returned by CrashComplete by construc-
tion: At ﬁrst we add all events from σ to σ . Then, we remove the invocation
events of incomplete operations that did not take eﬀect and the correspond-
ing crash event if one exists2 from σ . Next, we add a matching ok event to
each remaining incomplete operation and remove all remaining crash events
in σ .
– AbortComplete: We deﬁne σ  returned by AbortComplete by construc-
tion: At ﬁrst we add all events from σ to σ . Then, we remove all events of
aborted operations in σ  that did not take eﬀect. Next, we replace all re-
maining abort events in σ with matching ok events.
2 Note, that the last operation of each client in σ might be incomplete even if the
client did not crash.260 M. Majuntke et al.
Variables used by Algorithm 2 and 3:
sig signature /* signature /*
abort boolean /* flags if operation is aborted /*
valuesuc value /* written value of last successful write /*
retval value /* return value of the read operation /*
Variables used by Algorithm 2:
op cnt integer /* operation counter /*
op,x op,lso operation with ﬁelds id =( client id,op cnt,type,reg), value, tsv, sig
/* operation structure /*
tsvcomp[1..n] vector of integers /* ts vector of last completed operation /*
tssuc integer /* timestamp of last successful operation /*
Variables used by Algorithm 3:
op cnt[1..n] array of integer /* operation counter /*
op,x op,lso operation with ﬁelds id =( client id,op cnt,type,reg), value, tsm, sig
/* operation structure /*
tsm
1..n
comp[1..n] timestamp matrix of integers /* ts matrix of last completed
operation /*
tssuc[1..n] vector of integers /* timestamps of last successful operations /*
Fig.1. Variables for Algorithms 2 and 3
Transformation CrashComplete removes incomplete operations that did not
take eﬀect from σ. This is reasonable as such events do not inﬂuence the execu-
tion. Instead of removing them, such events could also be moved to the end of
sequence σ. The same argument applies to aborted operations that do not take
eﬀect which are removed by transformation AbortComplete. By ﬁrst applying
transformation CrashComplete a n dt h e nt r a n s f o r m a t i o nAbortComplete
to sequence σ, we have transformed σ into a sequence of events containing only
successful operations. On the transformed sequence we give two equivalent def-
initions of fork-linearizability taken from recent work of Cachin et al. [2].
Deﬁnition 3 (Fork-Linearizability). A sequence of events σ observed by the
clients is called fork-linearizable with respect to a functionality F if and only if
for each client Ci, there exists a subsequence σi of σ consisting only of completed
operations and a sequential permutation πi of σi such that:
1. All completed operations in σ occurring3 at client Ci are contained in σi;
and
2. πi preserves the real-time order of σi;a n d
3. the operations of πi satisfy the sequential speciﬁcation of F;a n d
4. for every op ∈ πi ∩ πj, the sequence of events that precede op in πi is the
same as the sequence of events that precede op in πj.
3 All successful operations of client Ci occur at client Ci; together with condition
3. this further includes all operations on which an operation of client Ci causally
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Deﬁnition 4 (Global Fork-Linearizability). A sequence of events σ obser
ved by the clients is called fork linearizable with respect to a functionality F if
and only if there exists a sequential permutation π of σ such that:
1. π preserves the real-time order of σ;a n d
2. for each client Ci there exists a subsequence πi of π such that:
(a) events in π occurring at client Ci are contained in πi;a n d
(b) the operations of πi satisfy the sequential speciﬁcation of F;a n d
(c) for every op ∈ πi∩πj, the sequence of events that precede op in πi is the
same as the sequence of events that precede op in πj.
Using two distinct but equivalent deﬁnitions of fork-linearizability simpliﬁes the
correctness proof of protocol Linear (by using Deﬁnition 3) and of protocol
Concur (by using Deﬁnition 4). The notion of fork-linearizability and global
fork-linearizability has shown to be equivalent [2].
4 The Protocols
In this section we present two lock-free protocols Linear and Concur that
emulate a fork-linearizable shared memory on a Byzantine server. The Linear
protocol is based on vectors of timestamps (described later in section 4.2) re-
sulting in a communication complexity of O(n). The Linear protocol serializes
all operations, and therefore it aborts concurrent operations even if they are
applied to distinct registers. The Concur protocol (introduced later in section
4.3) allows for concurrent operations if they are applied to distinct registers and
only operations on the same register are serialized. To achieve this, timestamp
matrices are used leading to a communication complexity of O(n2).
4.1 Protocol Properties
As mentioned above, Linear and Concur introduced emulate the shared func-
tionality of a read/write register among a collection of clients and a (possibly)
Byzantine server S.T h eLinear (Concur) protocol consists of two algorithms,
run by the clients and the server respectively. If the server is faulty, it may
refuse to respond to client requests or return (detectably) corrupted data such
that liveness of the emulated functionality is violated. A malicious server may
also mount a forking attack and partition clients. However, if the server behaves
correctly, we require that the emulation does not block and clients are not forked.
To formalize the desired properties of the Linear and Concur protocol,
we redeﬁne the notion of sequential and concurrent operations under step con-
tention [22] when the server is correct. We say that two operations op and op 
are sequential under step contention if op  does not perform steps at the server
S after op performed its ﬁrst step and before op performed its last step at server
S.O t h e r w i s e ,op and op  are concurrent under step contention.T h eLinear and
Concur protocol satisfy Fork-consistency and two liveness properties Nontriv-
iality and Termination:262 M. Majuntke et al.
Algorithm 1. Read / Write Operation of Client i
Read(j) do
rw operation(read,⊥,j)
if abort then return abort
return retval
Write(v) do
rw operation(write,v,i)
if abort then return abort
return ok
Fork-consistency: Every execution of the Linear and Concur protocols
satisﬁes fork-linearizability with respect to a shared read/write register em-
ulated on a Byzantine server S.I fS is correct, then every execution is
complete and has a linearizable history.
Nontriviality: When the server is correct, in an execution of the Linear (resp.
Concur) protocol every operation that returns abort is concurrent under
step contention with another operation (resp. with another operation on the
same register).
Termination: When the server is correct and σ is the sequence of events
exhibited by an execution of the Linear or Concur protocol, then after
applying transformation CrashComplete to σ, every operation in σ is
complete.
4.2 The LINEAR Protocol
The Linear protocol is based on two main ideas. The ﬁrst idea is that when
two or more operations access the registers concurrently, all but one are aborted.
In the protocol, operations need two rounds of communication with the server,
a n da no p e r a t i o nop is aborted if a ﬁrst round message of another operation
arrives at the server between the points in time when the ﬁrst round message
and the second round message of op is received by the server. Hence, among
the concurrent operations, the Linear protocol does not abort the “newest”
operation. This scheme ensures that a pending operation of a crashed client
does not interfere with other operations. Observe that using this strategy of
aborting, successful operations execute in isolation and therefore accesses to the
shared memory are serialized.
As a second idea, the Linear protocol assigns vector timestamps to opera-
tions such that a partial order ≤ on operations can be deﬁned based on these
timestamp vectors. The basic principle is that a client reads the most recent
timestamp vector from the server during the ﬁrst round, increments its own en-
try and writes the updated timestamp vector back to the server. Since successful
operations run in isolation, the corresponding timestamp vectors are totally or-
dered, as no two successful operations read the same timestamp vector during
the ﬁrst round. Clearly, a Byzantine server may fork two clients, but then there
are operations of these two clients op and op  with incomparable timestamp vec-
tors. By the requirement of fork-linearizability, these two clients must not see
any later updates of each other. For this purpose, the protocol ensures that the
two clients remain forked by preventing any client from committing an operation
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Algorithm 2. Linear Protocol, Algorithm
of Client i
rw operation(type, value, r) do 2.1
abort ← false 2.2
op cnt ← op cnt +1 2.3
op.id ← (i, op cnt,type,r) 2.4
send  submit,op.i d  to server 2.5
wait for message  submit r,x op,lso  2.6
if not verify(lso.sig) ∧ verify(x op.sig) 2.7
then halt
if not 2.8
∀k  = i : tsvcomp[k] ≤ lso.tsv[k] ∧
tssuc = lso.tsv[i] then halt
if not x op.id.client id = r then halt 2.9
if not x op ≤ lso ∧ 2.10
lso.tsv[r]=x op.tsv[r]
then halt
op.tsv ← lso.tsv 2.11
op.tsv[i] ← op cnt 2.12
if type = write then op.value ← value 2.13
sig ← sign(op.id||op.value||op.tsv) 2.14
op.sig ← sig 2.15
send  commit,op  to server 2.16
wait for message  commit r,re t type  2.17
tsvcomp ← op.tsv 2.18
if ret type = abort then 2.19
op.value ← valuesuc 2.20
abort ← true 2.21
else 2.22
tssuc ← op cnt 2.23
valuesuc ← op.value 2.24
if type = read then 2.25
retval ← x op.value
Algorithm 3. Concur Protocol, Algorithm
of Client i
rw operation(type, value, r) do 3.1
abort ← false 3.2
op cnt[r] ← op cnt[r]+1 3.3
op.id ← (i, op cnt[r],type,r) 3.4
send  submit,op.i d  to server 3.5
wait for message  submit r,x op,lso  3.6
if not verify(lso.sig) ∧ verify(x op.sig) 3.7
then halt
if not 3.8
∀k  = i : tsm
r
comp[k] ≤ lso.tsm
r[k] ∧
tssuc[r]=lso.tsm
r[i] then halt
if not x op.id.client id = r then halt 3.9
if not x op ≤ lso ∧ 3.10
lso.tsm
r[r]=x op.tsm
r[r]
then halt
forall k =1 ..n,k  = r do 3.11
if not tsm
k
comp, lso.tsm
k are comp- 3.12
arable then halt
op.tsm
k ← max{tsm
k
comp,lso.tsm
k} 3.13
op.tsm
r ← lso.tsm
r
3.14
op.tsm
r[i] ← op cnt[r] 3.15
if type = write then op.value ← value 3.16
sig ← sign(op.id||op.value||op.tsm) 3.17
op.sig ← sig 3.18
send  commit,op  to server 3.19
wait for message  commit r,re t type  3.20
tsmcomp ← op.tsm 3.21
if ret type = abort then 3.22
op.value ← valuesuc 3.23
abort ← true 3.24
else 3.25
tssuc[r] ← op cnt[r] 3.26
valuesuc ← op.value 3.27
if type = read then 3.28
retval ← x op.value
Description of the LINEAR Protocol. T h es h a r e dm e m o r ye m u l a t e db yt h e
Linear protocol consists of n SWMR registers X[1],...,X[n] such that client
Ci may write a value from set Value only to register X[i]a n dm a yr e a df r o ma n y
register. The detailed pseudo-code of the Linear protocol appears in Algorithm
1, 2 and 4 and the variables used are described in Figure 1.
A client performs two rounds of communication with the server S for both
Read and Write operations (see Algorithm 1). This is implemented by call-
ing procedure rw operation (Algorithm 2) with type read or write respec-
tively. When executing rw operation, the client sends a submit message to the
server S announcing a read or write operation and waits for a matching re-
sponse. The server S responds with a submit r message containing informa-
tion on the current state of the server and the value to be read. In the second
communication round, the client sends a commit message to the server and
waits for a commit r message to complete the operation. The commit r mes-
sage is either of type ok or abort indicating to the client the outcome of the
operation.264 M. Majuntke et al.
Algorithm 4. Linear Protocol, Algorithm
of Server S
Variables:
Pnd set of operation ids /* pend. ops */ 4.1
Abrt set of operation ids /* pending ops 4.2
to be aborted */
upon receiving message  submit,i d  from 4.3
client i do
Abrt ← Pnd 4.4
Pnd← Pnd∪{ id} 4.5
send  submit r,X[id.reg],lso  4.6
to client i upon receiving message  commit,op  from 4.7
client i do
Pnd← Pnd\{ op.id} 4.8
if op.id ∈ Abrt then 4.9
send  commit r,abort  to client i 4.10
else 4.11
X[i] ← op 4.12
lso ← op 4.13
send  commit r,ok  to client i 4.14
Algorithm 5. Concur Protocol, Algorithm
of Server S
Variables:
Pnd[1..n] array of set of operation ids 5.1
Abrt[1..n] array of set of operation ids 5.2
/* pending ops to be aborted */
upon receiving message  submit,i d  from 5.3
client i do
Abrt[id.reg] ← Pnd[id.reg] 5.4
Pnd[id.reg] ← Pnd[id.reg] ∪{ id} 5.5
send  submit r,X[id.reg],lso[id.reg]  to 5.6
client i upon receiving message  commit,op  from 5.7
client i do
Pnd[op.id.reg] ← 5.8
Pnd[op.id.reg] \{ op.id}
if op.id ∈ Abrt[op.id.reg] then 5.9
send  commit r,abort  to client i 5.10
else 5.11
X[i] ← op 5.12
lso[op.id.reg] ← op 5.13
send  commit r,ok  to client i 5.14
Each operation op has a timestamp vector of size n assigned to it during the
protocol. The timestamp vector is part of the operation data structure and is
denoted as op.tsv. The timestamp vector is used to deﬁne a partial order ≤ on
operations. For two operations op and op  we say that op ≤ op  iﬀ op.tsv[i] ≤
op .tsv[i] for all i =1 ...n.O p e r a t i o n so ft h eLinear protocol have the data
structure of a 4-tuple with entries id, value, tsv and sig,w h e r esig is a signature
on the operation by the client, tsv is the timestamp vector, value is the value
to be written by the operation. Note that for simplicity of presentation, a Read
operation rewrites the value of the client’s last successful Write.T h ee n t r yid is a
4-tuple (client id,op cnt,type,reg) itself, where client id equals i for Ci, op cnt
is a local timestamp of the client which is incremented during every operation,
type indicates whether the operation is a read or a write,a n dreg determines
the index of the register the client intends to read from. For Write operations
of client Ci, reg is always i.T h es e r v e rS maintains the n registers in a vector
X[1..n], where each X[i] stores the last successful operation of Ci.F u r t h e r ,t h e
server maintains an copy of the latest successful operation in variable lso.
When client Ci invokes a new operation op on register X[r], it increments
its local timestamp op cnt, sets the entries of op.id to the operation type and
register r, and sends op.id in a submit message to the server (lines 2.2–2.5).
The server labels the received operation op as pending. If the server receives the
submit message of another operation before the commit message of op,t h e nop
is aborted. The server then responds with a submit r message containing the
last successful operation lso, and the last successful operation x op applied to
register X[r] (lines 4.4–4.6).
After receiving operations lso and x op from the server, client Ci performs a
number of consistency checks (lines 2.7–2.10). If any of the checks fails, which
implies that the server is misbehaving, then the client halts. In the ﬁrst check, Ci
veriﬁes the signatures of lso and x op. The next check is needed to determine a
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vector for op which is greater than both lso’s timestamp vector and that of Ci’s
last completed operation. The timestamp vector of the latter is stored in tsvcomp
at Ci. The client checks that all but the ith entry in lso.tsv are greater or equal
than the corresponding entries in tsvcomp. Ci’s entry lso.tsv[i]m u s te q u a lt h e
timestamp of the last successful operation stored in tssuc. Checks three and four
are needed only by Read: Ci checks that x op is indeed the content of register
X[r]. The last check veriﬁes that lso is at least as large as x op and that lso.tsv[r]
equals x op.tsv[r].
If all checks are passed, Ci increments its own entry lso.tsv[i]a n dlso.tsv
becomes the timestamp vector of op. Then, Ci signs op.id, the write value and
the timestamp vector op.tsv, and sends op in a commit message to the server
(lines 2.11–2.16). The server, removes op.id from the set of pending operations
and checks if it has to be aborted. As mentioned earlier, if this is case, a submit
message of another operation was received before the commit of op and the
server replies with abort (lines 4.8–4.10). Else, op is stored in X[i]a n da l s o
stored in lso as the last successful operation and the server replies with ok (lines
4.12–4.14).
When client Ci receives the commit r message for operation op, op is com-
pleted and thus tsvcomp is updated with op.tsv.I fop is successful, then addi-
tionally tssuc becomes the ith entry of op.tsv.I fop is a read, then the value of
x op is returned (lines 2.18–2.25).
Correctness Arguments. Instead of returning the most recent value written
to register X[j]b yaw r i t eo p e r a t i o nopw, a Byzantine server may return an
old value written by op 
w.L e tCi be the client whose read operation opr reads
the stale value written by op 
w. Observe that the Byzantine server returns a stale
version of lso to Ci. Let us assume that all checks in Algorithm 2 are passed, thus
Ci is unaware of the malicious behavior of the server. Note, that the jth entry in
the timestamp vector of op 
w is smaller than the corresponding entry of opw,a s
both are operations of client Cj whose jth entry increases with every operation.
As the check in line 2.10 is passed, the jth entry in opr’s timestamp vector is also
smaller than the one of opw.A sCi increments the ith entry in the timestamp
vector during opr but not the jth entry, opr and opw are incomparable. We argue
that in this situation, no client commits an operation which is greater than both
opw and opr. As no client other than Ci increments the ith entry in a timestamp
vector, all operation of other clients that “see” opw have a timestamp vector
whose ith entry is smaller than opr.tsv[i]a n dw h o s ejth entry is larger than
opr.tsv[j]. Thus, such operations are also incomparable with opr and do not join
opw and opr. When client Ci “sees” such an operation incomparable to opr as
the latest successful operation lso, the check in line 2.8 is not passed because the
ith entry of lso is smaller than the timestamp of Ci’s last successful operation.
Hence, Ci stops the execution. Analogously, the same arguments can be applied
for client Cj and operation opw.266 M. Majuntke et al.
As all checks are passed when the server behaves correctly, it is not diﬃcult to
see that with a correct server, all operations invoked by correct clients complete.
Also with a correct server, operations are only aborted in the speciﬁed situations.
For a detailed correctness proof we refer to our technical report [23].
4.3 The CONCUR Protocol
The Concur protocol diﬀers from the Linear protocol in the way how con-
current access to the server is handled. In contrast to the Linear protocol, in
the Concur protocol concurrent operations that access diﬀerent registers at the
server are not aborted. However, the same aborting scheme as in the Linear
protocol is used in the Concur protocol on a register basis in order to serialize
all accesses to the same register. This means, that a correct server aborts opera-
tion op accessing register i if and only if a submit message of another operation
accessing register i is received while op is pending.
To deal with concurrent operations, in the Concur protocol, instead of one
timestamp vector, each operation is assigned n timestamp vectors, each corre-
sponding to one register. Such n timestamp vectors form the timestamp matrix
of an operation. The basic idea is that when a client accesses register j then
the client updates its own entry in the jth timestamp vector of the timestamp
matrix. It is important to note that even with a correct server, the Concur
protocol allows that two clients with concurrent operations may read the same
timestamp matrix from the server and update diﬀerent timestamp vectors such
that the corresponding operations become incomparable. However, the Concur
protocol ensures that (1) operations of the same client are totally ordered by ≤
and (2) operations accessing the same register at the server are totally ordered
by ≤. This is suﬃcient to show that for any operation op, all operations op
causally depends on, are ordered before op by ≤. Further, the Concur protocol
ensures that two forked operations — i.e. for some i,t h eith timestamp vectors
in the timestamp matrices of the two operations are incomparable — will never
be rejoined by another operation.
Description of the CONCUR Protocol. The Concur protocol has the same
message pattern as the Linear protocol and provides the same interface to the
clients (Algorithm 1). The Concur protocol uses a diﬀerent implementation of
procedure rw operation as described in Algorithm 3, Figure 1, and Algorithm
5. As the Concur protocol follows the structure of the implementation of the
Linear protocol, in the following we highlight only the diﬀerences between the
two protocols. The operation data structure diﬀers from the Linear protocol
only to the fact that the timestamp vector tsv is replaced by a timestamp matrix
tsm (Figure 1).
When client Ci invokes a new operation op on register r, it generates a new
operation id which it sends to the server in a submit message (lines 3.2–3.5).
One diﬀerence is that Ci maintains a separate operation counter for each regis-
ter op cnt[1..n]. The server replies with operations lso and x op contained in a
submit r message. Here, x op is the last successful operation stored in registerAbortable Fork-Linearizable Storage 267
r,a n dlso is the last successful operation that accessed register r. Note, that lso
may not be stored in register r. The server maintains information on pending
operations for each register separately (lines 5.4–5.6).
The ﬁrst and the third check are identical to the Linear protocol. The second
check on operations lso and x op performed by the client corresponds to the
second check in the Linear protocol. As Concur operations hold a timestamp
matrix, the check is performed on the rth timestamp vectors of the timestamp
matrices of lso and x op. The goal is to obtain a timestamp matrix that makes op
greater than the last completed operation of Ci and the last successful operation
accessing register r,s t o r e di nlso.L i k ei nt h eLinear protocol, the last check
ensures that lso is greater than x op and, unlike Linear, that the rth entries in
the rth timestamp vector of the timestamp matrices of lso and x op are equal.
This particular entry is the one which has been updated during x op (lines 3.7–
3.10).
To determine the timestamp matrix for op, client Ci selects the rth timestamp
vector from lso as rth timestamp vector of op and for all other indices it takes
the maximum timestamp vector from lso and Ci’s last completed operation.
Finally, client Ci increments its own entry in the rth timestamp vector using
op cnt[r] (lines 3.12–3.15). The remainder of the protocol is analogous to the
Linear protocol.
Correctness Arguments. First, we show that all completed operations of
client Ci are totally ordered by ≤. This is reasonable as Ci cannot know if an
aborted operation was actually aborted by the malicious server. To achieve this,
as the timestamp matrix of a new operation op of Ci depends on operation lso
received in the submit r message, the check in line 3.8 is needed: It guarantees
together with lines 3.14–3.15 that the rth timestamp vector of lso is greater than
the one of Ci’s last completed operation stored in tsmcomp. For the remaining
timestamp vectors it holds by line 3.12–3.13, as in each case the maximal times-
tamp vector among lso and tsmcomp is picked, that they are greater than the
respective one of Ci’s last completed operation. Hence, operation op is greater
than the last completed operation of Ci.
Second, we show that when Ci reads value opw.value from register j during op
then op is greater than the corresponding operation opw under ≤. Analogously,
by the check in line 3.12 and lines 3.13–3.15, it also holds that op is greater than
operation lso. As the check in line 3.10 ensures that opw is smaller or equal than
lso, by transitivity, op is greater than opw.
These two proof sketches give an intuition how the Concur protocol ensures
that all operations, op causally depends on, are ordered by ≤ before op.F o ra
detailed proof of the safety and liveness properties of the Concur protocol, we
refer to our technical report [23].
4.4 Complexity
In the Linear and Concur protocol all operations need two communication
rounds to complete. We arguewhy two rounds are necessaryfor Write operations:268 M. Majuntke et al.
The reasoning is based on the fact that the information possibly written by some
one-round Write is independent from some operations of other clients. Consider
thefollowingsequentialrunwithacorrectserverandclientsC1 andC2:Write1(1,x),
Read 2(1) → x, Write1(1,y), Read 2(1) → y. Note, that by the one-round as-
sumption, Write1(1,y) does not depend on the preceding Read 2(1) → x.T h u s ,
a Byzantine server may “swap” the order of these two operations unnoticeably.
Hence, we can construct a run with a Byzantine server, which is indistinguish-
able for C2: Write1(1,x), Write1(1,y), Read 2(1) → x, Read 2(1) → y.A sC2’s
second Read returns y, the run violates the sequential speciﬁcation and thereby
alsofork-linearizability.Thus,tworoundsareneededforWrite operationsandthe
Write operations emulated by the Linear and Concur protocol are optimal in
this sense. We conjecture, that Read operations can be optimized in the the Lin-
ear andConcur protocoltocomplete aftera singleround.This wouldalsoimply
that Read operations can be made wait-free.
The messages exchanged during the Linear protocol have size O(2(n + ι +
|v|+ς)), where ι i st h el e n g t ho fa no p e r a t i o ni d ,|v| denotes the maximal length
of a value from Value and ς is the length of a signature. The message complexity
of the Concur protocol is in O(2(n2 + ι + |v| + ς)).
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have presented lock-free emulations of fork-linearizable shared memory on
aB y z a n t i n es e r v e r ,Linear and Concur.T h eLinear protocol is based on
timestamp vectors and it has a communication complexity of O(n). It is the ﬁrst
lock-free protocol that emulates fork-linearizable storage at all. The impossibility
result by Cachin et al. [2] is circumvented by aborting concurrent operations. The
Concur protocol improves on the Linear protocol in the way how concurrent
operations are handled. In the Concur protocol only concurrent operations
accessing the same register need to be aborted. To achieve this, the Concur
protocol relies on timestamp matrices and has a communication complexity of
O(n2).
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